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Abstract This essay focuses on the possibility of adopting a representational
approach for technoscience, in which representation is considered as a situated
process of dynamic ‘‘intra-action’’ (Barad 2007). Re-elaborating the recent critiques
of representationalism (Thrift 2008), my analysis begins by analysing Hayles’s
situated model of representation from an early essay where she explains her deﬁ-
nition of constrained constructivism (Hayles [1991] 1997). The essay then discusses
the notions of ﬁguration and diffraction and the way they are employed by Haraway
in many of her writings for her critique of technoscience (Haraway 1991, 1997).
Finally, after considering diffraction through Barad’s reading of this practice in the
context of her theory of agential realism (2007), it shows the links that relate
constrained constructivism, situated knowledge and agential realism, and the way
all of them work at ‘‘diffract[ing] the rays of technoscience’’ (Haraway 1997: 16)
through an alternative representational practice.
Re ´sume ´ Cette re ´daction de focalise sur la possibilite ´ d’adopter une approche
repre ´sentationnelle envers la technoscience, dans laquelle la repre ´sentation est
conside ´re ´e comme un processus situe ´e d’ ‘‘intra-action’’ dynamique (Barad, 2007).
En re ´-e ´laborant les critiques re ´centes de repre ´sentationalisme (Thrift, 2008) mon
analyse commence par l’analyse du mode ´le situe ´ de repre ´sentation de Hayle, tire ´
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DOI 10.1007/s10202-011-0099-5d’un essai ante ´rieur dans lequel elle explique sa de ´ﬁnition du constuctivisme con-
traint (Hayles [1991] 1997). Puis, je traite les notions de ﬁguration et de diffraction
et la manie `re dans laquelle elles sont employe ´es par Haraway dans beaucoup de ses
publications concernant sa critique des technosciences (Haraway 1991, 1997).
Enﬁn, apre `s avoir conside ´re ´ la diffraction a ` travers les e ´crits de Barad sur cette
pratique dans le contexte de sa the ´orie de re ´alisme agentiel (2007), un lien devient
e ´vident entre le constructivisme contraint, la connaissance situe ´ee tl er e ´alisme
agentiel, ainsi que la manie `re dans laquelle ils participent dans la ‘‘diffraction des
rayons de la technoscience’’ (Haraway 1997: 16) par une pratique alternative
repre ´sentationelle.
Zusammenfassung Der folgende Essay befasst sich mit der Mo ¨glichkeit, in der
Analyse von Technowissenschaft einen repra ¨sentationalen Ansatz zu verfolgen, der
Repra ¨sentation als situierten Prozess dynamischer Intra-Aktion (Barad 2007) ver-
steht. Mit Bezug auf rezente Kritik des Repra ¨sentationalismus (Thrift 2008) setzt
meine Analyse bei Hayles’ ([1991] 1997) situiertem Repra ¨sentations-Modell und
dem von ihr propagierten constrained constructivism an. Der Essay diskutiert dar-
aufhin die Konzepte der Figuration und Diffraktion in Haraways (1991, 1997)
Analyse von Technowissenschaft sowie Barads Analyse von Diffraktion im Kontext
ihres agential realism (2007). Schließlich werden Gemeinsamkeiten von
constrained constructivism, situiertem Wissen und agential realism dargestellt;
insbesondere deren Versuch, durch alternative repra ¨sentationale Praktiken ‘‘die
Strahlen der Technowissenschaft zu beugen’’ (Haraway 1997: 16).
1 Introduction
According to Haraway, three ‘‘crucial boundary breakdowns’’ have put an end to the
‘‘border war’’ of Western science and politics today, which involve the territories of
production, reproduction and imagination (Haraway 1991: 151–153); these
boundaries are those between human and animal, organism and machine and the
physical and non-physical realms. Hence, Whatmore (2006) lists some important
shifts in scholarship that reﬂect such breakdowns, involving many theoretical ﬁelds,
from cultural geography to science and technology studies. The ﬁrst shift that
Whatmore identiﬁes is the relocation of agency in practice and performance, and a
re-embodiment of theory itself, which marks the passage from discourse to practice.
The second is the shift from meaning to affect, involving a rediscovery of the
precognitive and of its role in sense making as a ‘‘force of intensive relationality’’
(ibid.: 604). The third, a consequence of the previous dislocation, is the shift from
the human to the more-than-human, or from society conceived as a closed and
exclusively human whole to a multiplicity of assemblages constituting a hetero-
geneous sociomaterial fabric. Finally, the fourth shift is the move from a politics of
identity to a politics of knowledge, the way this is produced, negotiated or contested
according to different sociotechnical contexts and distributed practices (ibid.:
603–604). According to a similar approach, knowledge does not stand outside the
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situated; given that representations are social facts, we cannot get rid of them: it
doesn’t matter if they are true or false; what matters is, rather, how they work, and
why (Rabinow 1996: 28 ff.).
In her analysis, Whatmore directly quotes Barad to reinforce her argument that
matter does matter, and that it also ‘‘comes to matter,’’ performatively and
processually (Whatmore 2006: 605); Whatmore also refers to Barad in her previous
work in which, discussing the importance of distributed agency and the material-
semiotic practices of the constitution of the subject, she draws on Barad’s notion of
‘‘intra-action’’ (Whatmore 2002: 4, 57), which the latter formulates in the context
of her philosophy of ‘‘agential realism’’ (see below). In what follows, a compared
analysis of Hayles’s theorization of constrained constructivism, Haraway’s concept
of diffraction and Barad’s agential realism aims to reconceptualize the role of
representation for technoscience as an intra-active practice embedded and
embodied in hybrid sociotechnical networks. If ‘‘representationalism takes the
notion of separation as foundational’’ (Barad 2007: 137), talking of representation
as intra-action means considering the ‘‘mutual constitution of entangled agencies’’
(ibid.: 33) which do not precede, but rather emerge through their intra-acting
processes.
Whereas conventional epistemologies have conceptualized science as a ‘‘set of
representations of reality,’’ interactionist (or, rather, intra-actionist) approaches
consider science as intrinsically technological and performed through different
practices, interpretations and applications (Harding 2008: 186–187).
1 Scientiﬁc
knowledge cannot accurately represent the world from a distance, let alone its
objectivity, but only shows how the world effectively works and how represen-
tation can adequately ﬁt such workings (Latour 1987; Haraway 1997). Let us
think, for instance, of the ‘‘less false accounts’’ or ‘‘less false beliefs’’ about the
world in the sense that Harding intends them in her theory of standpoint
epistemology, ‘‘ones, apparently, as far as we can tell, less false than all and only
those against which they have so far been tested’’ (Harding [1997] 2004: 256).
These are provisional truths whose standards vary over time and space, but which
are nonetheless useful, effective notions against both universalist and relativist
claims. They are adequate interventions that replace the search for a semantic
match between sign and things with the search for efﬁcacy (Harding 2003:
156–157).
2 Beyond representationalism
In the last two decades, the debate around the issue of representation has occupied
several different ﬁelds, primarily as a reverberation of the anti-realist constructivist
1 For a detailed discussion on the implications of a technoscientiﬁc approach see the articles contained in
the special issue of Poiesis Prax (vol. 7, no. 1–2, 2010) entitled ‘‘Focus: Technoscience and Technology
Assessment.’’
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2 Discussing the different
traditions of the conceptualization of representation as the knowledge of reality,
Peschl and Riegler (1999) show the change of focus that has occurred in the last
decades, from an attempt to grasp the structure of the environment and map it onto a
representational structure, according to an analogical correspondence between signs
and things, to an awareness of representation as a dynamic and generative process
where environment, rather than reality, only constrains representation instead of
determining its outcomes.
According to a radical realist position, the domain of our experiences as
Wirklichkeit equates the world of things as Realita ¨t. Classical representational
theory transforms Wirklichkeit into a function of Realita ¨t. Only in a dialectic
materialistic perspective representation is re-contextualized and considered as the
result of an interaction between the observer, the observed object and the context
where observation takes place. But if we go further and adopt a self-referential
framework, drawing on the theory of autopoietic systems, we can deﬁnitely drop the
search for an external reality (without needing to either deny or afﬁrm its ontic
existence): in this case, representation is described as the perception of relations
among the element of the observed and self-observing system, which is
characterized by its operational closure. Once we consider representations not as
passive, however, accurate, reﬂections of an independent reality, but as active
constructions and viable, embodied and contingent processes of knowing, we can
continue to employ them and at the same time disengage them from a
correspondence with reality (and representationalism in a realist sense).
The acknowledgement of the agency of matter and of the hybrid connections
between theory and practice, human and non-human beings, takes the form of a
strong critique of representation in non-representational theory in particular. This, in
most cases, associates representation with the metaphysics of visualism, although, to
paraphrase Pickering (1994), when vision is delinked from ‘‘the representational
idiom’’ and rather aligned with the ‘‘performative idiom,’’ a recovery and redeﬁnition
of visuality always appears possible. The terms of the debate regarding non-
representational theory were initially assessed in the ﬁeld of human geography, but
soon turned out to be of interest for many other theoretical domains, such as feminist
studies, performance studies and science and technology studies (cf. Lorimer 2005).
In non-representational theory, knowledge is ﬁrmly located in matter or, to
partially paraphrase the subtitle of Barad’s book (2008), in ‘‘the entanglements of
matter and meaning;’’ it is also relationally generated, and by no way solely rational,
nor a subjective or even a human property, all assumptions that, on the contrary,
2 If we, to take only one example, consider scholarship on visual studies, we observe that what is deﬁned
as the ‘‘pictorial turn,’’ an ambiguous concept in itself, is rooted in the acknowledgement of the non-
mimetic, and in this sense non-representational, function of the image, which is now perceived as a
‘‘complex interplay’’ of relations rather than as the locus for the re-emergence of a pictorial presence
(Mitchell 1994). Not so differently, the linguistic turn that philosophers such as Rorty (1967) advocated
has actually been based on the same refusal of the model of representational transparency (and classical
textuality) which governed traditional pictorialism. Visuality is so permeated with affect and desires that
it is impossible to consider any visual representation independently from its effects, that is, the
performative aspects that inhere in visuality, or what Thrift speciﬁcally calls the ‘‘effectivity’’ of the
world (Thrift 2008: 113).
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shows, non-representational theory has its roots in different philosophical traditions
and their reciprocal points of contact: for example, feminist theory of performance
and feminist spatial analysis, ranging from Butler to Irigaray, the theory of practices
drawing on the work of such authors as Bourdieu and De Certeau, and what goes
under the name of ‘‘biological philosophy,’’ from Deleuze to the current speculations
of biosciences (cf. Thrift 2008: 113; Whatmore 2002). Thrift (2008: 5 ff.)
characterizes non-representational theory as the conjoined insistence on a number
of aspects. It features a radical empiricism—which is anti-essentialist in character
and which also distances itself from constructivism—while aligning itself with the
philosophies of becoming, without completely abandoning the lived immediacy of
the phenomenological and the precognitive. It includes an anti-subjectivism that
disengages perception from the human perceiver and attributes it to encounters
among heterogenous forms, or what he calls ‘‘new matterings’’ (ibid.: 22). It relies on
practices as being generative of actions rather than being their consequences, thus
showing an interest in the ‘‘effectivity’’ of the world (ibid.: 113). It insists on the
transhuman co-implication of bodies and things in a network of functions, where
embodiment becomes a diffuse situation of shared relationality. It requires an
experimental attitude, which owes much to the performing arts and is based on the
unpredictability and radical possibility of the evenmental (ibid.: 114). It takes an
affective stance that allows the retention of a sort of ‘‘minimal humanism’’ (ibid.: 13)
while at the same time being anti-humanistic in a traditional sense, and which
translates into an afﬁrmative ethics of responsibility and care. Finally, it has a
situational character where space is itself becoming, distributed and networked.
Needless to say, most of these elements can already be found in the theory of
situated knowledge, but then this should come as no surprise, given the common root
of non-representational theory and Harawaian philosophy in actor-network theory
(cf. Latour 2005). Haraway’s politics of representation, however, insists on the
importance of vision and images and, recognizing their contemporary pervasiveness,
tries to articulate a different, opaque and non-innocent representational attitude
which is partial, embodied and situated at the multiple crossings of the material-
semiotic ﬁeld. Her project of situated knowledge recognizes the impossibility of
doing without representations; a recovering of the sense of vision, or better, of re-
vision, is of the utmost importance for the feminist project of a multidimensional
cartography, which is itself a representation of a different kind, being always
generated from somewhere, from below and from within the networks of
technobiopower. That is why Haraway insists that we pose the following questions:
How to see? Where to see from? What limits to vision? What to see for?
Whom to see with? Who gets to have more than one point of view? Who gets
blinkered? Who wears blinkers? Who interprets the visual ﬁeld? What other
sensory powers do we wish to cultivate besides vision? (Haraway 1991: 194)
In a sense, a simple opposition to representation advanced in the name of the
world of matter is still risky, implicated in the double bind that sees matter and
meaning, or the semiotic and the material, as standing in a relation of mutual
exclusion. Analogously, says Haraway, if we counterpose situatedness to
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symmetry between the two, where each position is seen as purely alternative or
reciprocally exclusive (ibid.). Instead, ‘‘a map of tensions and resonances between
the ﬁxed ends of a charged dichotomy better represents the potent politics and
epistemologies of embodied, therefore accountable, objectivity’’ (ibid.). As Jacobs
and Nash (2003) afﬁrm, commenting on recent scholarship in cultural geography,
there is no need to dismiss representation altogether, particularly if we consider the
importance of a critique and a politics of representation for feminist work, and even
if we share the assumptions of non-representational theory. As they put it, we
‘‘might insist on attending to the place of image,’’ so as to keep open a ‘‘wider
semiotic framework’’ where words and things interrelate, without contradicting the
semiotics of materiality of non-representational theory (ibid.: 273).
3 Consistent representations
It is in this direction that Hayles ([1991] 1997) has looked for an escape from the
alternative between realism and anti-realism through her notion of ‘‘constrained
constructivism,’’ which does not tell us what reality is, but rather what ﬁelds of
possibility make certain representations ‘‘consistent’’ with reality, and thus
practicable for us. As a matter of fact, constrained constructivism is built on an
‘‘interactive, dynamic, locally situated model of representation.’’ Here, the notion of
‘‘consistency’’ replaces that of ‘‘congruence.’’ Whereas congruence implies a one-
to-one correspondence between signs and things, based on Euclidean geometry,
consistency eschews this oppositional logic; rather than being kept in between the
true/false dichotomy, it stands in between the not-true/not-false relation, which is
one that subverts the symmetry between afﬁrmation and negation.
What we call ‘‘observables,’’ writes Hayles, always depends on locally situated
perspectives according to which different pieces of information about the
environment are processed, as demonstrated in the example of the frog’s visuality,
which Hayles gives at the beginning of her essay, drawing on the well-known article
of Lettvin et al. (1959). For the frog, the Newtonian ﬁrst law of motion, which for
humans applies to every object upon which a force is exerted, does not work
equally. A frog’s brain is only stimulated by small objects in rapid movement,
allowing it to detect potential prey, whereas bigger or static objects elicit a
completely different response. Recognizing, however, that every reality is relative
to the observer does not lead Hayles to conclude that systems close in on themselves
leaving the world outside, or that perceptions can do without representations at all,
as Lettvin, Maturana, McCulloch and Pitts seemed to presuppose, and which
Maturana and Varela further developed (Maturana and Varela 1980).
As Hayles notes (1995), even if we agree with the non-representational aspect of
perception, we do not necessarily need to believe that ‘‘it has no connection with the
external world,’’ particularly when we consider that a relation can also be
transformative, rather than solely reﬂexive (ibid.: 75). And further, she argues
contra Maturana and Varela, the observer is caught in continuous feedback loops
within the autopoietic processes of the system, rendering ‘‘the domain of the
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representation, but rather intending to formulate it differently, as ‘‘a dynamic
process rather than a static mirroring’’ (Hayles [1991] 1997), Hayles opts for the
way Niklas Luhmann, whose systems are as closed as Maturana’s, nonetheless
contemplates much more activity in systems, showing their contingency rather than
their inevitability, and thus ﬁnds a way to escape the realist/constructivist debate
(Hayles 1995: 98). Actually, claims Hayles, ‘‘unlike Maturana,’’ Luhmann
twists the closed circle of tautological repetition (‘‘we do not see what we do
not see’’) into an asymmetric ﬁgure (‘‘one does not perceive when one
perceives’’). The energy generated by these contradictory propositions
rebounds like a loaded spring toward the very term that Maturana’s closure
was designed to erase, namely ‘‘reality.’’ What is enacted rhetorically within
the structure of this sentence is formalized in Luhmann’s theory by investing
the observer with the agency to draw a distinction. By making a distinction,
the observer reduces the unfathomable complexity of undifferentiated reality
into something she can understand (ibid.: 97).
What Hayles appreciates in Luhmann’s position is that he recognizes ‘‘that
closure too has an outside it cannot see’’ (ibid.: 98). This leads us to acknowledge,
on the one hand, the fact that ‘‘the very interlocking assumptions used to achieve
closure are themselves the result of historical contingencies and embedded
contextualities.’’ (ibid.: 98). On the other, it allows for a preservation of the
‘‘correlation’’ or ‘‘interactivity’’ that connections, rather than absolute distinctions,
make possible (Hayles et al. 1995: 16). Representations, in this context, appear not
as a mirroring of ‘‘external’’ reality, but as ‘‘species-speciﬁc, culturally determined
and context-dependent’’ processes of dynamic interaction.
In Hayles’s terms (Hayles [1991] 1997), a representation can be consistent with
reality, or inconsistent with reality. In the latter case, this suggests that an
inconsistent representation does not offer an adequate account of our interaction
with what Hayles calls ‘‘the ﬂux.’’ She uses the terms ‘‘cusp’’ and ‘‘ﬂux’’ in order to
reformulate the notion of representation and its viability
3:
On one side of the cusp is the ﬂux, inherently unknowable and unreachable by
any sentient being. On the other side are the constructed concepts that for us
comprise the world. Thinking only about the outside of the cusp leads to the
impression that we can access reality directly and formulate its workings
through abstract laws that are universally true. Thinking only about the inside
leads to solipsism and radical subjectivism. The hardest thing in the world is to
ride the cusp, to keep in the foreground of consciousness both the active
transformations through which we experience the world and the ﬂux that
interacts with and helps to shape those transformations (ibid.).
3 These notions of cusp and ﬂux recall the concept of ‘‘double contingency’’ in Luhmann’s theory, which
regulates the way Ego and Alter ‘‘intra-act,’’ relating to each other both through the indeterminacy of their
own autoreferentality and the determinability of their own selections (cf. Baraldi et al. 1990: 75 ff.).
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representations are consistent, manifesting ‘‘local interactions rather than positive
correspondences’’ with the ﬂux, the more their ‘‘instrumental efﬁcacy’’ allows us to
‘‘ridethecusp,’’sotospeak(ibid.).Representationsareruledbyconstraints,whichdo
not tell us what reality ‘‘in its positivity’’ is, but can tell us when representations are
consistent with reality, enacting some possibilities and enabling certain distinctions
insteadof others. Constraints, then, operatein the making of selections betweenthose
representations which are viable and those which are not (ibid.).
To better show the role of constraints for representations in her theory of
constrained constructivism, Hayles adopts and modiﬁes the Greimas Square (Fig. 1).
False and True occupy the top line of the square, so that they are mutually
exclusive, since they stand in an exclusionary relation of opposition. Instead, the
bottom line is occupied by the couple Not-true and Not-false, whose relation is not
an oppositional one: actually, not-false are those representations which are
consistent with the ﬂux, while not-true are all the unknown representations, that
is, the not yet practiced representations. This puts not-true and not-false in a relation
that is one of consistency and of unknowability, rather than of antithesis—a relation
that ‘‘folds together the ability to negate with the ability to specify,’’ that is a
relation of denial (the unknown) and assertion (the consistent) rather than of
negation and afﬁrmation (ibid.). If I, for instance, look at the pen that lies at my
desk, I can surely say that it is an orange pen. However, my assertion is based on the
observation of the colour that the plastic case of my pen appears to be. But if
someone asks whether I have a black pen to lend, I can surely give them the same
pen, given that it writes in black ink, thus is a black pen too. While asserting that my
Fig. 1 Hayles’s modiﬁed Greimas Square
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only further specifying something about the way it works.
The difference here is that denial and assertion are what Hayles calls ‘‘marked,’’
or modal, terms, which cannot be assimilated to the ‘‘transparencies of non-modal
statements’’ proper to realism, like true and false ones. This means that both not-true
and not-false positions do not only not exclude the corresponding terms along the
vertical axis, but stand with them in a relation of implication, which, nonetheless, is
in no way symmetrical: ‘‘denial implies negation while subtly differing from it, just
as assertion implies afﬁrmation without exactly being afﬁrmation.’’ This, then,
should rather be intended as a relation of articulation, where ‘‘articulations emerge
from particular people speaking at speciﬁc times and places, with all of the species-
speciﬁc processing and culturally-conditioned expectations that implies’’ (ibid.).
But the terms of the semiotic square are implicated along the diagonal axis too,
revealing what Hayles calls ‘‘a common concern with the limits of representation’’
(ibid.). The ‘‘elusive negativity’’ expressed by the not-true position at the bottom left
of the semiotic square is worth considering in detail. This, in fact, is the position that
mostly escapes the either/or alternative of both realism and anti-realism, being a kind
ofnegativitythatisneithernegativenorpositive,andisthusinassimilable:letusthink
of the inappropriate/d other in Min-ha’s terms as Haraway (1992) explains it, where
the inappropriate/dotherisnottheuntouched, authentic other,butthe otherthat isnot
‘‘originally ﬁxed by Difference’’ and that stands in a ‘‘critical, deconstructive
relationality, in a diffracting rather than reﬂecting (ratio)nality’’ (ibid.: 299).
Elusive negativity is, for Hayles, precisely what designates the position at the
cusp:
The diagonal connecting true and not-true reveals their common concern with
the limits of representation. At the positive (‘‘true’’) end of the diagonal, the
limits imply that we cannot speak the truth. At the negative (‘‘not-true’’) end,
they paradoxically perform the positive function of gesturing toward that
which cannot be spoken. Elusive negativity, precisely because of its doubly
negative position, opens onto the ﬂux that cannot be represented in itself
(Hayles [1991] 1997).
The signiﬁcation of the cusp is obviously always ambiguous, depending on the
result of the encounter between physical and semiotic constraints that allude both to
the reality of the world and the reality of language—the Harawaian material-
semiotic ﬁeld—without fully representing them. Such a position recognizes that
what we can get to know are, at least, the boundaries of the cusp; it thus bypasses
not only realism but also relativism. As Hayles explains at the end of her text (ibid.),
commenting on the notion of partial perspective elaborated by Haraway, it is not
that we only partially see the truth in things while remaining ignorant of its totality.
It is, rather, that partiality is the whole that we see as the result of contextual and
speciﬁc interactions with the ‘‘ﬂux.’’ That is why she insists on what happens ‘‘at the
dividing line,’’ in between the two sides (Hayles et al. 1995: 34). So,
If it is true that ‘‘reality is what we do not see when we see,’’ then it is also true
that ‘‘our interaction with reality is what we see when we see.’’ That
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unmediated ﬂux brings to it. […] Omitting the zone of interaction cuts out the
very connectedness to the world that for me is at the center of understanding
scientiﬁc epistemology (ibid.).
4 Inhabiting ﬁgurations
Constrained constructivism presupposes a language of metaphors: the difference
that passes between metaphors and descriptions is, for Hayles, the same that passes
between consistency and congruence. Haraway prefers speaking of ﬁgurations to
name such ‘‘performative images that can be inhabited’’ (Haraway 1997: 11). Even
though ﬁgurations always retain a visual aspect, which is not a secondary element in
our ‘‘visually saturated technoscientiﬁc culture’’ (ibid.; Haraway 2000: 102–103),
ﬁgures need not be literally representational or mimetic. They ‘‘involve at least
some kind of displacement that can trouble identiﬁcations and certainties’’
(Haraway 1997: 11): they are neither complete nor static pictures of the world,
but are representationally adequate insofar as they keep their performativity, with all
its contradictions, alive.
Braidotti (2003), in her postmetaphysical feminist philosophy of difference,
explains that this distinction between ﬁgurations and metaphors is intended to
overcome the classical dichotomy of identity and alterity. From a Deleuzian
perspective, the ﬁgural, based on difference and becoming, is opposed to the
traditional aesthetic category of the ﬁgurative (or traditional representation) which,
on the contrary, is based on identiﬁcation and analogy between sign and object
(Braidotti 2002: 78 ff.; 2003: 48; 2006: 170). According to Braidotti, ﬁgurations
map the metamorphoses and hybridizations of subjectivities in technoculture.
Actually, ﬁgurations do not stand outside the world they describe, but are living
maps and transformative accounts never detached from their geopolitical and
historical locations; they serve to ‘‘represent what the system had declared off-
limits’’ without, in turn, attributing a separate status to it, as if the representation of
differences were an end in itself (Braidotti 2006: 170). Figurations do not reify nor
romanticize alterity, but ‘‘materially embody stages of metamorphosis of a subject
position towards all that the phallogocentric system does not want it to become’’
(Braidotti 2002: 13).
Whereas metaphors generally presuppose two distinct tracks—that of signs and
that of things—and work at reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar by linking two
meaning systems, of which one is considered inert and stable, so as to reduce the
one to the other—like the practice of mapping traditionally does (cf. Smith and Katz
1993)—ﬁgurations maintain a reciprocity between the two orders of meaning that
shed light on another kind of space (and on different subject positions): one that is
relational, active and unﬁxed. They stress transition, interconnectedness, interaction
and border-crossing, as opposed to individuation and distinction (Braidotti 2002
Met: 70). As Smith and Katz contend, discussing the function of spatial metaphors
in contemporary social theory, reconceived metaphors can work as an ‘‘Alice’s
passage through the looking glass,’’ since they also ‘‘have the reciprocal effect of
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Haraway’s ﬁgurations rework precisely the unﬁxity that co-implicates the two sides
of Hayles’s analysis, transforming an exterior relation of correspondence into a
relation of co-implication. They are of the utmost importance, then, for a project of
technoscience intended as a travelogue of ‘‘distributed, heterogenous, linked
sociotechnical circulations’’ (Haraway 1997: 12).
Haraway traces the origin of the meaning of the practice of ﬁguration back to
the semiotics of Western Christian realism, on the one hand, and to Aristotelian
rhetoric on the other (Haraway 1997: 9 ff.; 2000: 141). In the history of
Catholicism, the literal and the ﬁgurative continuously intersect, and ﬁgures are
attributed to the power to contain the development of events, either of salvation or
of damnation—something which Haraway also devises in the millenaristic tone of
many discourses of technoscience. Aristotle highlights the spatial character of
ﬁgures of discourse: in his philosophy, ‘‘a ﬁgure is geometrical and rhetorical;
topics and tropes are both spatial concepts’’ (Haraway 1997: 11). This spatial
aspect is visible in the strong link that Haraway’s ﬁgurations, in fact, maintain
with location, although clearly locations cannot be made to coincide with abstract
space, but rather, as Braidotti (2003) emphasizes, outline a cartography of spatial
power relations and make sense of the different positionalities that these deﬁne.
Figurations, moreover, also retain a temporal aspect that is by no means
developmental, but assumes the modality of ‘‘condensation, fusion and implosion’’
which is contrary to the modalities of ‘‘development, fulﬁlment and containment
proper of ﬁgural realism’’ (Haraway 1997: 12). It is precisely this implosion of
boundaries between subject and object, or between the material and the semiotic,
that puts borders in a constructive and transformative tension rather than using
them as dividing lines. Figurations are thus tropoi, in that they, according to Greek
etymology, do not simply ﬁgure, but ‘‘turn’’ what they ﬁgure (Haraway 2008:
159).
4
It is once again Braidotti who, drawing on Haraway, shows how Harawaian
ﬁgurations can be employed to develop a ‘‘politically charged practice of alternative
representation:’’
Feminist theories of ‘‘politics of location’’ (Rich [1984] 1987), or ‘‘situated
knowledges’’ (Haraway 1991)[ …] stress the material basis of alternative
forms of representation, as well as their transgressive and transformative
potential. In feminism, these ideas are coupled with that of epistemological
and political accountability (Harding 1987), that is the practice that consists in
unveiling the power locations which one inevitably inhabits as the site of one’s
identity (Braidotti 1999: 91–92).
This alternative practice, as Haraway repeats, can be delinked from the
theologics of representation that revolves around reﬂection and reﬂexivity and
their root in the mastery of light, which the tradition of feminist critique rightly
dismisses, and be rather coupled with an optics that registers the passages of light
4 Similarly, Latour distinguishes between ‘‘intermediaries’’ and ‘‘mediators,’’ where only the latter
transform what they transport rather than simply carry it (Latour 2005: 39).
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undergoes while passing through them.
5 A different way of thinking about light
As a joke, albeit a serious one, Haraway afﬁrms that semiotics is a science of four
branches, ‘‘syntactics, semantics, pragmatics and diffraction’’ (Haraway 2000: 104).
Intended as the production of difference patterns, diffraction, the fourth ‘‘optical’’
branch of semiotics, treats light differently from reﬂection, though, as we will see,
not necessarily in opposition to representation. As Barad (2007) so poignantly
summarizes,
First and foremost […] a diffractive methodology is a critical practice for
making a difference in the world. It is a commitment to understanding which
differences matter, how they matter, and for whom. It is a critical practice of
engagement, not a distance-learning practice of reﬂecting from afar. (ibid.: 90)
Undoubtedly, reﬂection and reﬂexivity have their roots in representationalism
(ibid.: 87), but the opposite is not necessarily true. I thus disagree with the reading
that Campbell (2004: 174 ff.) offers of Haraway’s writings and their presumed
evolution regarding the issue of representation, because I think that the model of
articulation that a practice like diffraction presupposes is analogous to the way
representations are reworked according to the notion of ﬁguration, a project already
pursued by Haraway in such writings as ‘‘Situated Knowledges.’’ I would not
counterpose the latter to texts like ‘‘The Promises of Monsters’’ or ‘‘Modest
Witness’’ where, according to Campbell, Haraway would abandon the representa-
tional model in favour of the diffractive one. Rather, what Haraway drops is the
metaphysics of representations, while at the same time she articulates representa-
tions by means of diffractive practices, so as to render them still employable for
feminist technoscience.
As we have seen, when Haraway retrieves a notion like that of location for her
idea of situated knowledge, she is at the same time exposing, via Withehead, ‘‘the
fallacy of misplaced concreteness’’ that lies at the core of either traditional realism
or of traditional representationalism, both being based on an ontological distinction
between representations and reality as well as on the existence of a distant and
invisible representer (Haraway 1991; Barad 2007: 46 ff.). So, Barad’s belief in the
dynamism and articulation of matter, which is not ‘‘a support, location, referent, or
source of sustainability for discourse’’ or any other external force inscribing onto it,
but ‘‘always already an ongoing historicity’’ (Barad 2003: 821), is not so different
from Haraway’s faith in the historical embeddedness of ﬁgurations. It is worth
repeating that Haraway never abandons representations nor opposes diffractions to
them. If Barad thinks that we should leave representations behind decisively for
‘‘matters of practices/doings/actions’’ (ibid.: 802), Haraway is saying that seeing too
is a doing and that we are responsible for the generativity of our visual practices
(Haraway 1991). Accordingly, Barad, when discussing the functioning of scanning
tunnelling microscopes (STM), which not only allow the visualization of but also
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there, but are rather ‘‘condensations or traces of multiple practices of engagement’’
(Barad 2007: 53). Representations are performed as well as performing, so that we
should rather talk about a set of representational practices that produce ‘‘what we
take to be the evidence’’ (ibid.); our belief in them depends on historical and cultural
variables, so that critically engaging with representations is always possible and,
according to Haraway, also desirable (see also Barad 2007: 49). Only when they are
critically engaged are metaphors put in motion, that is, activated through a process
of translation, becoming effective, dynamic ﬁgurations rather than remaining
reﬂective depictions of static givens.
When considering light, translation requires that we also consider that light has a
history (Haraway 2000: 103). In fact, diffraction is a physical phenomenon that
records the patterns of difference caused by the movements of rays resulting from
the passage of light through a prism or a screen: ‘‘a diffraction pattern does not map
where differences appear, but rather maps where the effects of difference appear’’
(Haraway 1992: 300). This process replaces the idea of a mimetic mirroring proper
of reﬂection and refraction, or what Haraway calls the displacement ‘‘of the same
elsewhere’’ (Haraway 1997: 273)—usually employed as a metaphor for the
objectivity of science as well as for the traditional notion of artistic representation—
in order to encompass interference, difference and interaction instead. ‘‘To make a
difference in material-semiotic apparatuses,’’ says Haraway, we must be able ‘‘to
diffract the rays of technoscience so that we get more promising interference
patterns on the recording ﬁlms of our lives and bodies’’ (ibid.: 16). The historicity of
diffraction, then, lies in its situated, embodied character and in its being involved in
facticity and in process making. This also entails a critique of the methodology of
reﬂexivity and its inﬁnite regression, which radical constructivism would counter-
pose to the realist option, since as we have already seen in Hayles’s critique of the
separate domain of the observer, reﬂexivity too is trapped in a geometry of
exclusions (the top line of Hayles’s semiotic square) whenever it poses difference as
an absolutely unrelated alternative to sameness (Barad 2007: 72). ‘‘Reﬂexivity does
not more than mirror mirroring’’ (ibid.: 88), because, even if the observers re-enter
the picture, they still maintain a distance form the object of their gaze, foreclosing
any ‘‘reading through’’ (ibid.: 90) the entanglements of phenomena and the
production of borders.
Diffraction concerns the world of physical optics rather than that of geometrical
optics. It describes the behaviour of waves when they encounter an obstacle, thus
practically all optical phenomena; it also, contrary to geometrical optics,
interrogates the nature of light. In physics, as Barad explains in her analysis,
diffraction experiments are frequently used to compare the behaviour of waves to
that of particles. One way to observe the phenomenon of diffraction, which the
naked eye can easily notice when a pebble is launched into water or in the
iridescence of a soap bubble, is the two-slit experiment, in which diffraction
patterns resulting in bright or dark spots on a target screen—depending on the
reciprocal enhancement or destruction of waves—are obtained when a light source
passes, precisely, through a two-slit screen (ibid.: 71 ff.). According to classical
physics, only waves can produce diffraction patterns, since only waves, not
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quantum physics studies how particles can also behave like waves under certain
circumstances. She then discusses the ‘‘modiﬁed’’ two-slit experiment at length,
drawing on Niels Bohr’s diagrams; without entering into too much detail here, it
sufﬁces to say for the purpose of our argument that depending on the apparatus
used in the two-slit experiment, that is, whether a ‘‘which path detector’’ is
employed or not, matter, and light as well, are observed to manifest either particle
or wave behaviour. This apparent paradox forces us to radically rethink the
dualism that lies at the core of representationalism and the idea that ‘‘practices of
representing have no effect on the object of investigation’’ (ibid.: 87), given that
diffraction not only shows the entanglements of meaning and matter, but is itself
an entangled phenomenon.
Thus, adopting a diffractive methodology, as Barad does drawing on Haraway’s
lesson, implies a profound rethinking of Western ontology and epistemology (ibid.:
83) because it replaces the analogical methodology, which consists in relating two
separate entities by way of an external observer, with a methodology that shows
how ‘‘practices of knowing are material engagements that participate in (re)con-
ﬁguring the world’’ (ibid.: 91). Producing differences is what establishes connec-
tions rather than reinforcing distinctions: As Haraway writes, ‘‘diffraction patterns
are about a heterogeneous history, not originals’’ (Haraway 2000: 101). A
representation is not a sign that mirrors a separate external referent; it is rather a
diffractive practice that reveals the coemergence and the co-implication of both
meaning and matter. Agency is redeﬁned as precisely ‘‘a matter of intra-acting,’’
from which the ‘‘agential realism’’ at the core of Barad’s philosophy is derived:
since ‘‘intra-actions are constraining but not determinate,’’ (my italics) intra-acting
neither belongs to a completely free subjectivity nor to a fully determined reality,
but rather happens in a material-semiotic ﬁeld where ‘‘particular possibilities for
acting exist at every moment, and these changing possibilities entail a responsibility
to intervene in the world’s becoming, to contest and rework what matters and what
is excluded from mattering’’ (Barad 2003: 826–827). Talking about constraining
intra-actions brings us back to the idea of consistency theorized by Hayles,
according to which, as we have seen, constraints are what enable us to select among
viable, that is, consistent, rather than congruent representations, shifting represen-
tations from what that we could see to the ‘‘interaction with reality [that] we see
when we see’’ (see above).
This very much complicates the notion of vision as well as that of location (and
the situatedness of the observer), since it dismantles the exteriority on which both
have traditionally relied, and replaces it with speciﬁc forms of connectivity as well
as accountability. Even if the observer comes back, he/she does not stand in a
separate domain, but is connected in continuous feedback loops with his/her
cognitive processes, since the closure of the observer’s domain is never pregiven,
but always achieved (Hayles 1995: 78). Even as observers, we take part, writes
Barad, in the ‘‘world’s differential becoming’’ (Barad 2007: 91) in which our
knowledge enacts the world engaging in ‘‘speciﬁc worldly conﬁgurations’’ from the
inside (ibid.).
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As Haraway notes, since we as humans need a ‘‘different kind of theory of
mediations’’ (Haraway 2008: 174), new representational practices rather than new
representations are required to make differences rather than merely see them. Since
feminist theory has shown the criticality as well as the importance of a notion like
that of representation, representations cannot be easily dismissed but should rather
be reworked and signiﬁed according to alternative practices and wider semiotic
frameworks. Adopting a performative idiom as a substitution for the representa-
tional one, thus getting completely rid of representations, leaves a series of
questions unresolved, as Hayles and Haraway particularly highlight. These concern
the domain of the observer as much as the status of what is observable, and most of
all, that which relates the two sides, the sign and reality, or meaning and matter
(Barad 2007).
The theory of constrained constructivism elaborated by Hayles ([1991] 1997)
tries to formulate the viability of representations through the idea that they can
never be congruent with reality but, rather, be consistent with it. Even if we do not
get to know reality through representations, we can nonetheless ‘‘ride the cusp’’ that
separates and at the same time connects us with the ﬂux, touching the limit of
representation (and, also, the limit of the knowability of reality). Modifying
Greimas’s Square, Hayles proposes that we deﬁne the position at the cusp in terms
of ‘‘elusive negativity,’’ a double negativity that connects us with the dividing line
where we meet our interactions with reality and our representations of it as well.
This zone of intra-action is what Haraway’s practice of alternative representation
goes through in order ‘‘to diffract the rays of technoscience’’ (Haraway 1997: 16).
Haraway’s notions of ﬁguration and of diffraction serve to displace ﬁxed identities
and put boundaries in constructive tension, requiring engagement rather than
distancing. While Barad recognizes the importance of diffraction as a generative
practice and interprets this notion in a non-representational way in her philosophy of
agential realism, I have tried to argue that there is no need to oppose diffractions to
representations, since what Haraway abandons is, ﬁrst and foremost, the
metaphysics of representation, but not the performativity of images which can be
read through and used to read through at the same time.
We conﬁgure our world and establish connections with it through our ways of
seeing. Diffraction, so intended, does not simply regard our visual ﬁeld, but is a
practice that invests our knowledge, our imaginary and our practices at the same
time: it is, as Haraway writes, ‘‘a […] technology for making consequential
meanings’’ (Haraway 1997: 273). Productive interruption, as well as reciprocal
reinforcement, is allowed by diffractions and their unpredictable and unintended
effects: different realities and unforeseen possibilities can emerge from diffractive
practices (Haraway in Schneider 2005: 150).
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